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Abstract
Previous research has shown that successful non-violent resistance (NVR) campaigns promote
democracy compared with violent revolutions and top-down liberalization. However, research to
date has not examined the character and quality of the democratic regimes following NVR cam-
paigns, or evaluated the mechanisms that produce this effect. In this paper, we address this gap by
analyzing the effect of NVR on the quality of democracy, using the Polyarchy index from the
Varieties of Democracies project and its sub-components: (1) elected executive; (2) free and fair
elections; (3) freedom of expression; (4) associational autonomy; and (5) inclusive citizenship.
Using kernel matching and differences-in-differences estimation we find that initiating a democratic
transition through NVR improves democratic quality after transition significantly and substantially
relative to cases without this characteristic. Our analysis of the Polyarchy index’s sub-components
reveals that this positive effect comes about primarily owing to improvements in freedom of
expression and associational autonomy. This finding speaks to the strength of NVR in promoting
expressive dimensions of democracy.
Keywords
Democratization, democratic quality, non-violent resistance, protest
Introduction
A growing number of scholars have argued that the international system has entered an age
of ‘‘democratic decline’’ (e.g. Diamond, 2015). Diverse processes are behind this decline,
from rising populism and erosion of democratic norms in advanced democracies to a closing
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of political space by semi-democratic and authoritarian regimes. Yet one key factor has been
the failure of many recent democratic transitions to result in democratic regimes of high
quality. While numerous transitions have increased the absolute number of ostensibly demo-
cratic regimes, many of these regimes are far from the ideal conception of democracy, and
remain highly restrictive in their levels of political representation and protection of human
rights. There are exceptions—countries whose transitions have resulted in highly developed
democracies. Yet these success stories exist in the context of many optimistic democratic
breakthroughs followed by disillusionment. If we are interested in reversing democratic
decline and ensuring democratic political representation we must examine the causes of var-
iation in democratic quality.
What explains this variation? One growing body of research points to the power of non-
violent resistance (NVR).1 Multiple studies have shown that NVR is more effective not only
in deposing dictators but also in improving long-term democratic governance relative to vio-
lent revolutions or top-down liberalizations (Bayer et al., 2016; Chenoweth and Stephan,
2011). The decentralized structure and pluralistic practices of non-violent campaigns serve
as a template for future politics and reconfigure power during and after transition, making
NVR a powerful means of consolidating democracy and stemming democratic decline.
However, previous studies say little about the character and quality of democratic regimes
following NVR movements, and have left many of the mechanisms through which NVR
affects future democracy untested or not clearly articulated. Scholars have either focused on
the durability of democracy after NVR (Bayer et al., 2016) or the degree of democracy on a
very general level (Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011). In this paper, we fill this gap by perform-
ing the first analysis of NVR’s effects on democratic quality that disaggregates relationships
based on specific dimensions of democracy.
We make the following contributions: first, we provide more stringent and extensive tests
of NVR’s effect on the quality of democracy using comprehensive data on regime transitions
after World War II and an index of democracy and its sub-components. Second, compared
with previous studies, we advance causal identification of NVR’s effect on democratization
through a research design that combines matching with differences-in-differences (DiD) esti-
mation. Our analysis provides strong evidence that initiating a democratic transition through
NVR substantially improves democratic quality. Third, we articulate theoretical mechanisms
linking NVR to specific democratic dimensions. We perform the first analysis of NVR’s
effect on the democratic dimensions of: (1) elected executive; (2) free and fair elections; (3)
freedom of expression; (4) associational autonomy; and (5) inclusive citizenship. Through
our analysis, we find that improvements in freedom of expression and associational auton-
omy largely explain the NVR’s positive effect on democratic quality. The other dimensions
of democracy appear to be less affected.
Related literature on non-violent resistance and democratization
The literature on NVR has had a longstanding concern with democracy. Early works by
seminal scholars argued that non-violent resistance was inherently democratizing (Sharp,
1973). These arguments were given credence by transformative historical events such as the
mostly peaceful transitions in Eastern Europe at the end of the Cold War (e.g. Hadjar,
2003). In this context, numerous studies empirically analyzed the consequences of NVR for
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democratization, in other words, if and how non-violent campaigns induce transitions from
autocracy to democracy and influence subsequent political development.2
Ackerman and Karatnycky (2005) conducted the first comparative study on the relation-
ship between NVR and democratization. They found that countries improved in terms of
political rights and civil liberties more substantially after ‘‘bottom-up’’ non-violent transi-
tions as compared with ‘‘top-down’’ or violent transitions. This finding was later replicated
by Johnstad (2010) using different measures of democracy. However, neither study employed
multivariate analysis. Given the complexity of democratization, numerous confounding fac-
tors could make the relationship spurious.
Chenoweth and Stephan (2011) substantially advanced this literature by providing accu-
rate data on more than 300 resistance campaigns in their Non-Violent and Violent Conflict
Outcome (NAVCO) database. Using this data, Chenoweth and Stephan (2011: 213) find
that NVR campaigns significantly increase the degree of democracy and the probability of a
country being minimally democratic five years after the end of the conflict. However, their
study only compares the consequences of NVR campaigns relative to violent campaigns,
omitting cases of elite-led democratization. Moreover, their sample also includes resistance
campaigns in states that were already democratic.
Celestino and Gleditsch’s (2013) later study accounts for some of these limitations by
focusing on democratic transitions occurring in autocratic regimes. Their work confirms that
the presence of an NVR campaigns increases the odds of transition towards democracy.
However, they did not investigate how resistance campaigns affect political development
after democratic transition.
In proposing causal mechanisms for how NVR advances democracy, scholars have pre-
dominately focused on its benefits for civil society (Celestino and Gleditsch, 2013;
Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011). While participation in violent campaigns is typically limited
to a small cadre of primarily young men, participation in civil resistance is open to much
larger segments of society, regardless of age, gender, and physical ability (Schock, 2005: 40).
This participation advantage helps NVR achieve success through exacerbating elite divisions
and undermining the state’s material bases of support. It also promotes democracy follow-
ing a successful campaign, as large and diverse campaigns provide a check on the new
regime’s power and constrain the elite’s ability to defect from democratic norms. However,
this theoretical argument has not been tested systematically.
In addition, many studies have incorporated a limited number of control variables, or in
some cases simply not accounted for alternative explanations. This is a critical omission as
an extensive literature on the structural preconditions of resistance campaigns indicates that
NVR and democratization share common predictors. Nepstad (2011), for instance, argues
that economic decline and the existence of free spaces for organizing are crucial in the emer-
gence of non-violent resistance. Ritter (2015) argues that an ‘‘iron cage of liberalism’’ fos-
tered by authoritarian regimes’ connection to the West facilitated the emergence and success
of non-violent action, and Lawson (2015) argues that the primarily non-violent ‘‘Arab
Spring’’ revolutions succeeded in part because of the characteristics of the preceding regimes.
Thus, accounting for structural alternative explanations is crucial for making causal infer-
ences about NVR and democratization.
The broader democratization literature has also looked at non-violent resistance, and
includes studies that control for some of these alternative explanations. Initially, the demo-
cratization literature focused on processes of elite interaction. Scholars considered negotia-
tions between different factions of hard-liners and soft-liners within the regime and the
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opposition respectively as the most important factor determining transitional outcomes
(Higley and Burton, 1989; O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986; Przeworski, 1991). Mobilization
from below, while common during transitions, was assumed to be epiphenomenal to demo-
cratization or even potentially dangerous to a transition’s stability (Karl, 1990: 8).
Instances of democratization in which mass resistance was crucial, such as those after the
end of the Cold War in Eastern Europe and Sub-Saharan Africa, inspired a shift in focus.
Bratton and van de Walle (1997) showed how protest was central in the Sub-Saharan
African transitions. Using a collective action model, Oberschall (2000) explained how popu-
lar movements could depose communist regimes in Eastern Europe and highlighted the
importance of NVR for the subsequent democratic deepening in these states. Ekiert and
Kubik (1998) demonstrated how collective protest influenced post-transition political devel-
opment in East Germany, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia. Their findings suggested that
protest activity fosters democratic consolidation if it becomes an institutionalized way of
participating in politics. Analyzing democratization with a large sample of states from 1955
to 2002, Ulfelder (2005) found that events of non-violent contentious collective action pro-
mote democratization in single-party and military regimes. Likewise, Teorell (2010) investi-
gated the impact of popular mobilization on democratization. His results suggested that
peaceful anti-government protest effectively increases the level of democracy in the short
and the long run. Similar to the NVR literature, Teorell (2010: 104–107) also highlighted the
number and diversity of participants as the crucial mechanism that explains how non-violent
protest fosters democratization. However, both Ulfelder and Teorell rely on event data from
the Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive (Banks, 2011 [1979]) to measure popular
mobilization. This data has been criticized for various reasons, including geographic bias
and lack of transparency (Celestino and Gleditsch, 2013: 387; Woolley, 2000), and its reli-
ance on newspaper reports may make it particularly ill-suited to capturing data on NVR
(Day et al, 2015).
The potential importance of NVR during a political transition is also powerfully rein-
forced by research on the democratizing impact of particular modes of transition. In this
approach, the transition process is interpreted as a critical juncture that shapes subsequent
political development in a path-dependent way (Guo and Stradiotto, 2014; Karl and
Schmitter, 1991; Munck and Leff, 1997). Guo and Stradiotto (2014) test this assumption
empirically using data on all democratic transitions since 1900. They conceptualize four
modes of transition: conversion, cooperative, collapse and foreign intervention.3 Their find-
ings suggest that a cooperative transition process increases both the quality and duration of
the democratic successor regime. However, like others, Guo and Stradiotto (2014) rely on a
minimalist definition of democracy, measuring the level and duration of democracy using
the Polity IV index (Marshall et al., 2010). Furthermore, their categorization of modes of
transition does not account for the presence or absence of resistance campaigns and the use
of violence during transition.
Similarly, Haggard and Kaufman (2016) examine the differential impact of ‘‘elite-led’’ or
‘‘distributional conflict’’ transitions from 1980 to 2008, with the distinctions between these
two modes based on mass mobilization and meaningful pressure on elites to democratize
because of this mobilization. They suggest that transitions initiated through distributional
conflict advance democratization because countries that have experienced distributional
conflict advance a more robust defense of freedom of association, assembly, and speech.
However, the aggregate nature of their data does not allow them to systematically test this
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contention, nor do they examine the differences between non-violent and violent resistance,
which the literature on NVR would strongly suggest would have relevant effects.
Cervellati et al. (2014) examine if violent conflict during democratic transition influences
subsequent democratic development. They find that it has a negative effect on democracy
relative to peaceful transitions. However, their results are based on a limited sample of
regimes that democratized between 1972 and 2003, and focus solely on protections of civil
liberties to measure the quality of democracy. Moreover, they combine transitions initiated
by NVR with those initiated by elite-led liberalization, obscuring the important distinction
between top-down and bottom-up transitions identified by Haggard and Kaufman.
Integrating work from the literature on NVR and studies of transition modes, Bayer
et al. (2016) analyze how transitions induced by NVR affect democratic survival relative to
violent and elite-led transitions. Their findings suggest that democratic regimes where the
transition process was induced by NVR survive substantially longer than regimes without
this characteristic. However, Bayer et al. (2016) only test the impact of NVR on the duration
of democracy after transition (i.e. whether regimes maintained the minimum requirements
of democratic rule) and do not address democratic quality and its subcomponents.
To summarize, the extant work provides robust evidence that NVR increases the odds of
a successful democratic transition and benefits subsequent democratic development.
Similarly, empirical studies on democratization and political development after different
modes of transition also highlight the importance of popular mobilization. Yet there are sev-
eral gaps in the existing literature.
Owing to data limitations, previous studies tend to measure democratization very
abstractly, often using democracy indexes that scholars have critiqued for possessing mea-
surement error (Coppedge et al., 2011). Aggregated measures of democracy tell us little
about the character of the regimes that follow NVR. To understand the mechanisms under-
lying this relationship and the nature of the democratic regimes that follow successful NVR
campaigns, it is crucial to investigate these regimes’ character and quality. An important
study on the structural determinants of non-violent resistance, many of which are similar to
the determinants of democracy, also makes it clear that research on this topic must take into
account the potential for omitted variable bias and endogeneity, which many existing studies
have only done to a limited extent (Chenoweth and Ulfelder, 2017).
Theoretical approach
Democratic transitions and subsequent political development
Our theoretical approach links the mode of democratic transition to the subsequent develop-
ment of democratic quality in a political regime. To conceptualize events of democratic tran-
sition, we build on Boix et al. (2013), who classify regimes on the two dimensions of political
contestation and participation. Participation refers to a minimal level of suffrage (i.e. a
majority of adult men has the right to vote). Contestation consists of two conditions: (1) the
executive is directly or indirectly elected in popular elections and is responsible either directly
to voters or to a legislature; and (2) the legislature (or the executive if elected directly) is cho-
sen in free and fair elections. If these conditions are met, a democratic transition occurred
and a formerly autocratic regime is considered democratic (Boix et al., 2013: 8–9).
We consider democratic transitions as critical junctures where political actors’ choices
have an enduring impact on political development (Capoccia and Kelemen, 2007: 341;
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Soifer, 2012: 1572–1573). Our main interest is in explaining whether democratic transitions
initiated by NVR have beneficial effects on post-transition democratic quality. Specifically,
we distinguish transition modes regarding the relevance of a resistance campaign and
whether that resistance campaign was primarily violent or non-violent.4 We assume that
transitions shaped by NVR systematically differ from transitions either shaped by violent
resistance or without a resistance campaign. By shaping democratic transition, NVR cam-
paigns set the subsequent regime on a path favorable for democratic development. The rela-
tionship is not deterministic. Events may interfere with the mechanisms linking non-violent
resistance and democratization (Chandler, 2018). Yet on average, NVR will incline demo-
cratic transitions towards more democracy.
To specify what we mean by democratic political development we build on the quality of
democracy literature. Research on the quality of democracies compares existing empirical
manifestations of democratic regimes with an ideal type of democracy (Diamond and
Morlino, 2004; O’Donnell et al., 2004; Munck, 2016; Przeworski, 2010). To assess the qual-
ity of democracy after transition, we build on Teorell et al.’s (2016) account of Dahl’s (1971:
1989) concept of polyarchy. While there is significant disagreement among scholars concern-
ing the crucial elements of democracy, Robert Dahl’s (1971) seven principles—which he
terms ‘‘polyarchy’’—are an area of widespread agreement. According to Dahl, democracy
relies upon the following principles: (1) government by constitutionally bound elected offi-
cials; (2) the regular practice of free and fair elections; (3) citizens having universal suffrage;
(4) the right to run for public offices; (5) freedom of expression; (6) access to alternative
sources of information; and (7) the right to form autonomous associations (e.g. political par-
ties or non-governmental organizations).
Teorell et al. (2016) collapse Dahl’s seven principles into five dimensions of democratic
quality. The first dimension, ‘‘elected officials,’’ evaluates how the chief executive is elected.
Depending on the system of government it also uses information on other political institu-
tions such as the proportion of legislators that is elected. The second dimension, ‘‘free and
fair elections,’’ addresses whether elections can be considered free and fair, which refers to
an absence of registration fraud, systematic irregularities, government intimidation of the
opposition, vote buying, and election violence. The third dimension, ‘‘freedom of expres-
sion’’, addresses to what extent a government respects press and media freedom, the freedom
of expression for ordinary citizens, as well as the freedom of academic and cultural expres-
sion. The fourth dimension, ‘‘associational autonomy’’, measures freedom of association for
political parties and civil society organizations. Finally, the fifth dimension, ‘‘inclusive citi-
zenship,’’ captures the share of adult citizens that have the legal right to vote in national
elections.
We distinguish between conditions that are necessary and sufficient for democratic transi-
tion, which is binary, and the quality of democracy after transition, which is a matter of
degree. To observe a democratic transition requires that the conditions of political contesta-
tion and participation are satisfied. However, achieving these minimum conditions says very
little about the democratic quality of the resulting regime. For instance, a free and fair
founding election is a necessary condition for democratic transition but regimes display dif-
ferent degrees of freedom and fairness at the ballot. Using this conceptualization, we seek to
answer this question: given a successful transition to democracy, indicated by the accom-
plishment of a minimal amount of political contestation and participation, to what extent
do post-transition democratic regimes match the ideal type of democracy, both as a whole
and in regard to each of its individual dimensions?
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How NVR improves democratic quality
We argue that democratization via NVR improves subsequent democratic quality through
an organizational spillover effect. The democratic organizational culture of NVR movements
spills over to the post-transition political environment (Della Porta and Diani, 2006: 245–
249; Sharp, 2005: 428), advancing a democratic civic culture (Almond and Verba, 1963).
NVR movements are diverse, and their organizational culture will vary from case to case.
Hence our arguments are probabilistic, rather than deterministic. However, as we show
below, there is good evidence to believe that the process of non-violent resistance tends to
systematically push movements, and the political systems in which they operate, in a demo-
cratic direction.
This effect comes about through mechanisms of both socialization and selection. Non-
violent action tends to create large, inclusive, and diverse movements composed of broad
segments of society. Accordingly, NVR campaigns often develop a culture of compromise
to balance the diverse interests of the participant groups. As Chenoweth and Stephan (2011:
207) point out, participation in NVR campaigns ‘‘encourages the development of democratic
skills and fosters expectations of accountable governance.’’ One prominent example of this
cooperative culture is the Velvet Revolution in Czechoslovakia, in which leaders such as
Vaclav Havel developed a practice of holding daily plenums during which the voices of all
of the groups involved in the revolution could be heard and decisions made only after the
groups came to consensus.5 The non-violent campaign prefigured a democratic culture in
which the interests of ordinary people from diverse backgrounds were important for political
decision-making.
In contrast, pacted transitions, while encouraging cooperation among a small group of
elites, tend to focus on excluding the interests of those outside of this limited circle.
O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986) highlight this dynamic. Pacts socialize participants not into
long-term cooperation in pursuit of a shared public good, but rather into pragmatic deal-
making to protect private interests. Related work by Albertus and Menaldo (2018) shows
how pacted transition, under certain conditions, can lead to an elite-biased democracy,
which favors the interests of former autocratic elites and business elites over ordinary citi-
zens’ demands for popular representation and redistribution.
In addition to these socializing effects, non-violent resistance is also likely to select for
participants who already hold these values. As Jeremy Weinstein’s work shows, different
types of resistance campaigns attract different types of participants. The profile of the aver-
age participant then shapes the campaign’s future actions (Weinstein, 2006). We argue that
individuals predisposed to favor inclusion, oppose violence, and support consensus-based
decision-making are more likely to choose to participate in a non-violent resistance move-
ment. Contextual factors such as the prior regime type and levels of repression will affect the
pool of potential campaign participants. However, the commonalities of non-violent resis-
tance movements such as their reliance on a particular tactical repertoire and basing in wide-
spread popular support rather in small cadres of highly motivated supporters, will tend to
direct a similar group of people towards participation.
The Philippines’ ‘‘People Power’’ revolution shows both mechanisms at work. From 1983
to 1986 opposition forces organized non-violent resistance to the Ferdinand Marcos regime,
peaking in massive demonstrations that, together with military defections, brought down
Marcos’s government in 1986. Many of this movement’s leaders were long-time political
elites interested in a return to political competition who found a non-violent struggle against
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the Marcos regime more appealing than armed struggle. Yet three years of involvement in
non-violent resistance further increased their democratic preferences, for example by convin-
cing many to run political campaigns that did not rely on traditional mechanisms of bribery
and intimidation but instead employed appeals to moral authority and the public good
(Thompson, 1995: 134; Zunes, 1999). The Philippines’ transition came with many challenges,
including several attempted military coups by the revolution’s erstwhile military allies, and
some degree of continued political corruption. Yet the dynamics of the People Power revolu-
tion significantly pushed the country in a democratic direction.
After successful democratization through NVR both elites and civil society are well
equipped to foster improvements in democratic quality. After transition, participants of the
NVR movement often obtain influential governmental or administrative positions. They can
then use these offices to spread the ideals they either learned while participating in non-
violent resistance or which attracted them to non-violent resistance in the first place. At the
same time, the experience of NVR strengthens civil society, creating conditions that empower
citizens to actively participate in politics and hold elites accountable. Specifically, we expect
the following effects of NVR on each of the sub-dimensions of democracy.
First, we expect that NVR-induced transitions will specifically foster associational auton-
omy, which refers to low entry barriers for political parties and civil society organizations,
as well as the degree of autonomy of these groups from the state. During NVR-induced
transition, civic forces have the opportunity and capacity to advance institutional reform to
improve freedom of association (e.g. by being involved in a National Conference or drafting
a new constitution). Political elites are also ill advised to exclude civic forces from transi-
tional reforms, because they depend on this constituency in upcoming elections. The experi-
ence of NVR inherently involves widespread mobilization beyond and in opposition to the
state. Thus, it creates numerous constituencies with experiences that will cause them to place
a high value on freedom of association and the capabilities to hold the state accountable to
protect this value (Sharp, 2008: 53; Tarrow, 1998: 165). Related to this mechanism, Murdie
and Purser (2017) show that a country’s experience with non-violent protests advances indi-
vidual support for freedom of association. Successful democratic transitions induced by
NVR become a collective memory that fosters individual willingness to protect democratic
rights.
In Benin, which achieved democratic transition through NVR in 1991, political elites
opted for an integrative transition process with many civil society organizations involved in
drafting a new constitution. As a result, the constitution highly values freedom of associa-
tion and the right to resist unconstitutional behavior by the government. Accordingly, civil
society remobilized and engaged in non-violent protest in 2006 and 2016 against attempts to
amend the constitution to allow a third term for the incumbent president.6
The Polish experience illustrates how NVR becomes a ‘‘collective memory’’ that operates
even decades after a political transition has concluded. After democratic transition in 1990,
protest became an institutionalized method for articulating grievances and thereby advanced
democratic consolidation (Ekiert and Kubik, 2001; Lande´, 2001). In July 2017 the Polish
‘‘rebellious civil society’’ protested again against a judiciary reform threatening democratic
checks and balances. During the protests, Lech Wa1e˛sa, the former Solidarnos´c´ leader,
addressed the crowd, arguing that it was necessary defend the democratic rights that they
had achieved through non-violent resistance in 1989. After days of mass street protests, the
Polish president Duda felt compelled to veto the reform bill put forward by the Polish
government.
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Second, transitions induced by an NVR campaign are also likely to be particularly benefi-
cial for improving freedom of expression. Non-violent resistance achieves its leverage
through the widespread communication of often dangerous or unpopular preferences.
Accordingly, if leaders and organizations involved in the NVR campaign can exercise influ-
ence during transitional democratic reforms, they will tend to advance constitutional rights
of freedom of expression. Moreover, transitions initiated by NVR may provide particularly
powerful environments for dealing with the abuses of the past. In many elite-led transitions,
certain ‘‘authoritarian legacies’’ may retain influence through pacts. A key aspect of these
pacts is often protection from an accounting for the old regime’s abuses. For instance, in the
Spanish transition to democracy elites engaged in a Pacto del Olvido (Pact of Forgetting),
whereby discussion of the abuses of the past was actively suppressed for the sake of placat-
ing old regime members who remained influential during the transition period (Encarnacio´n
2008: 131–149; Fernandes, 2015: 1087–1088). In contrast, in countries such as South Africa,
where NVR played a key role, the post-Apartheid government instituted a process of Truth
and Reconciliation whereby the grievances of the Apartheid area could be directly addressed
(Gibson, 2006). This necessity of protecting political pacts means that elite-led transitions
are more likely to suppress freedom of expression, restricting the ways in which media and
individuals can use speech to affect the political order. NVR campaigns, on the other hand,
tend to encourage a diverse, participatory culture of expression of grievance that strengthens
freedom of expression.
Given that a culture of dialogue and inclusiveness is a crucial feature of NVR campaigns,
and that transitions brought about through NVR are less likely to have pacts protecting
members of the old regime from scrutiny of their past misdeeds, we expect more substantial
improvement of press freedom and freedom of expression for civil society organizations if
transition was induced by an NVR campaign, relative to cases of democratic transition with-
out this characteristic.
Third, cultural spillover from the NVR campaign to the post-transition environment may
also advance the quality of subsequent democratic elections. Former participants of the
NVR movement that attained political office may improve the quality of elections through
electoral reforms. For example, Jerzy Regulski—an activist in the Polish Solidarity
movement—used his position as minister of local government reform in the first government
after Poland’s democratic transition in 1989 to advance major decentralization reforms,
inspired by Solidarity’s idea of ‘‘the self-governing republic’’ (Regulski, 2003). In elite-led
transitions, in contrast, there are few incentives to engage in such reforms. Additionally,
NVR campaigns such as Otpor! in Serbia or the People’s Power movement in the Philippines
trained citizens in election monitoring to prevent fraud during the elections that initiated
democratic transition. Successful monitoring of elections by activist groups sends a strong
signal to future governments that manipulation of election results will be uncovered.
We expect that NVR-induced transitions do not significantly affect the sub-dimensions of
elected officials and inclusive citizenship. While NVR movements certainly often push for
reforms that advance democratic executive selection and universal suffrage, we have no rea-
son to believe that violent resistance movements or elite-led democratization efforts will attri-
bute less importance to these dimensions of democratic quality. Additionally, both of these
dimensions of democratic quality refer to formal-institutional criteria, which allow little var-
iation across democratic countries in terms of quality. Since the end of World War II univer-
sal suffrage has been adopted almost globally, even in autocratic regimes. Moreover, our
definition of democratic transitions also entails criteria of a minimal level of suffrage and
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elected officials and thereby further reduces potential variation in the quality of these two
sub-dimensions.
In sum, we assume that the spillover of civic culture from the campaign to the post-
transition environment is beneficial for the quality of democracy in general, but promotes
the sub-dimensions of associational autonomy, freedom of expressions, and free and fair
elections most substantially. Table 1 summarizes our hypothesized relationships between
NVR and the particular dimensions of democracy.
Research design
Using data from Boix et al. (2013) on democratic transitions and data on resistance cam-
paigns from Chenoweth and Lewis (2013), we created a dataset that combines information
on democratic regimes with information on the presence of NVR during these regimes’ tran-
sitions. Our dataset consists of all democratic regimes that succeeded an autocratic regime
between 1945 and 2006. Whereas the dataset by Boix et al. (2013) on transitions covers the
time-period 1945–2007, the dataset by Chenoweth and Lewis (2013) accounts for the period
1945–2006. Therefore, our sample includes only regimes that originated after 1945 and
before 2007.7 Our full sample consists of 101 democratic regimes.
We coded a campaign as relevant for the transition if it was present in the year of the
transition or the year before the transition and aimed at political change of the incumbent
autocratic regime. More specifically, we considered campaigns where NAVCO coded the
campaign goal as ‘‘regime change’’, ‘‘significant institutional reform’’, or ‘‘policy change’’.
Correspondingly, we did not consider campaigns where the goal was coded as ‘‘territorial
secession’’, ‘‘greater autonomy’’, or ‘‘anti-occupation’’. Furthermore, to ensure the validity
of this coding, we inspected for each case if the form of resistance was violent or non-violent
and also checked whether there was indeed a causal link between the resistance campaign
and the transition process. We distinguish between (1) regimes whose transition process was
induced without a resistance campaign (i.e. elite-led top-down transitions), (2) regimes whose
transition process was induced by a violent resistance campaign, and (3) regimes whose tran-
sition process was induced by an NVR campaign.8 Table 2 describes the frequency of these
categories. Few democratic transitions in our sample were induced by violent resistance cam-
paigns, in line with earlier findings on the rarity of violent resistance leading to democracy
(e.g. Celestino and Gleditsch, 2013).
More than half of the sample consists of regimes with no resistance campaign (i.e. elite-
led top-down transitions) and roughly 40% of the cases experienced an NVR campaign dur-
ing transition. Because of the rarity of transitions initiated by violent resistance, in our main
Table 1. Hypothesized relationships.
Dependent variable NVR effect
H1 Democratic Quality Positive
H2 Associational Autonomy Positive
H3 Freedom of Expression Positive
H4 Free and Fair Elections Positive
H5 Elected Executive None
H6 Inclusive Citizenship None
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analysis we use a combined category for transitions that were induced without a resistance
campaign or by a violent resistance campaign. For our treatment indicator, we only distin-
guish whether the transition was induced by an NVR campaign or not.9
Our dependent variable is the quality of democracy. We use both an aggregate measure of
democratic quality and separate measures of each of its components. We take our data for
the different outcome variables from the Varieties of Democracy dataset (Coppedge et al.,
2016).10 Our primary operationalization is the polyarchy index, which, as described above, is
based on the following five components: (1) elected officials, (2) free and fair elections, (3)
freedom of expression, (4) associational autonomy, and (5) inclusive citizenship. To test our
hypotheses on the mechanisms through which NVR affects democratic quality, we also use
each component as a dependent variable. All dependent variables range from zero to one,
with higher values indicating a higher quality of democracy.11
We account for the following confounding and prognostic factors identified as most
important in previous studies (Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011; Gassebner et al., 2012;
Chenoweth and Ulfelder, 2017; Teorell, 2010): GDP per capita, military legacy, previous
instability, proportion of neighboring democracies, and urbanization.12
Our variable measuring the level of GDP per capita uses an updated version of the
‘‘Expanded Trade and GDP Data’’ compiled by Gleditsch (2002), transformed using natural
logarithms. Resistance campaigns may be more likely to occur when economic grievances
are more prevalent among the population (Celestino and Gleditsch, 2013; Chenoweth and
Lewis, 2013; Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011). Moreover, GDP per capita is also an impor-
tant predictor of democratization (Boix and Stokes, 2003). The variable military legacy is a
binary variable indicating whether the pre-transition autocratic regime was a military
regime, as coded by Geddes et al. (2014). Previous studies have shown that if a military
regime preceded a democratic transition there is an increased risk of future political instabil-
ity, which harms democratic quality (Cheibub, 2007). Using the Boix et al. (2013) dataset,
we measure previous instability by counting the number of regime changes from 1900 until
the transition in question. A history of political instability is potentially related to both the
onset of resistance campaigns (Chenoweth and Lewis, 2013) and difficulties in democratic
political development (Boix and Stokes, 2003). To measure how widespread democracy is in
a regime’s geographic environment, we use the variable neighboring democracies, which is
simply the proportion of democratic states in the region.13 Empirical studies have found that
democratic development is affected by international and regional factors. Democratic qual-
ity is generally higher in a geographic environment where democracy is widespread, i.e. most
of the neighboring countries are democratic states. Neighboring countries serve as role mod-
els and thereby trigger the diffusion and spillover of democratic ideas and norms (e.g.
Gleditsch and Ward, 2006). Urbanization is the percentage of the population living in cities
Table 2. Categorical coding of resistance campaigns during transitions.
Frequency Percentage
No resistance campaign 56 55.45
Violent resistance campaign 4 3.96
Non-violent resistance campaign 41 40.59
Total 101 100
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with more than 100,000 inhabitants. We obtain our data for this variable from the National
Material Capabilities dataset version 4.0 (Singer, 1987). In the context of modernization
theory, urbanization is considered a social requisite for democracy (Lipset, 1959), indicating
that citizens develop liberal preferences and beliefs. Urbanization also facilitates mobiliza-
tion of participants in resistance campaigns (Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011). We report
summary statistics for all outcome measures and covariates in the Online Appendix.
To analyze the effect of NVR-induced democratic transition on the quality of democracy
in the post-transition regime we use kernel matching in combination with DiD estimation.
This approach is a potent method for achieving causal inference with observational data
(Heckman et al., 1998; Smith and Todd, 2005).
With kernel matching we account for observable heterogeneity across countries/regimes.
We use kernel matching to create a sample, where our groups of treatment and control cases
(i.e. regimes where democratization was induced by NVR and similar regimes where NVR
was not relevant for the transition) are as similar as possible with respect to observed base-
line characteristics, namely the control variables described above.14
However, numerous unobservable factors may also bias our estimates of NVR’s effect on
post-transition democratic quality. For instance, one potential unmeasured factor is a demo-
cratic political culture. Countries with positive attitudes toward democracy among elites and
the population should be more likely to experience the occurrences of NVR-induced transi-
tions and also more likely to improve in democratic quality after transition. Similarly, coun-
tries with pre-existing active civil societies or less repressive past regimes may also be more
likely to experience both NVR and democratization.15
To address this unobserved heterogeneity, we use a DiD specification to estimate the
effect of NVR on improvements in democratic quality. In the DiD setup we observe the out-
come for two groups at two points in time. Our groups are regimes where democratization
was induced by an NVR campaign and regimes without this characteristic. In both groups
we observe democratic quality before and after transition. For each outcome variable we
create indicators that measure the difference between its level before the transition and up to
five years after the transition. We consider the transition process itself as an intervention at
which regimes in the treatment group experience NVR and regimes in the control group do
not. To obtain the DiD effect we subtract the mean change from pre- to post-transition
democratic quality in the non-NVR group from the mean change in the NVR group.
Thus, while kernel matching addresses issues of confounding and selection bias caused by
observable characteristics, DiD estimation accounts for unobservable but time-invariant dif-
ferences between regimes that did and did not experience NVR-induced transitions. By look-
ing at difference in improvements instead of difference in levels of democratic quality after
transition, the DiD approach accounts for variation in democratic predisposition across
countries.16
Empirical analysis
Before moving into the results of our DiD design, we first simply descriptively compare the
development of democratic quality for regimes induced by NVR to regimes without this fea-
ture. Figure 1 shows the average score of the polyarchy index and its subdimensions for these
two groups from one year before the democratic transition until five years after the demo-
cratic transition occurred.
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We report the results for the polyarchy index in the upper middle panel of Figure 1. As
shown there, regimes where the transition was induced by an NVR campaign on average
achieve substantially higher levels of democratic quality after transition than regimes without
this feature. While both groups are at about the same level of democratic quality one year
before the transition (i.e. about 0.32), NVR-induced regimes one year after transition reach
a polyarchy level of 0.65. Regimes where transition occurred without NVR only attain an
average level of 0.51. This difference remains substantive through five years after transition.
The results for the subdimensions indicate that the positive effect of NVR on polyarchy
mainly comes about owing to improvement in freedom of expression and freedom of associa-
tion, and to some extent the quality of elections. On these dimensions NVR-induced regimes
have higher democratic quality than regimes where democratization occurred by violent
means or owing to elite-led transition. However, the effect of NVR on the quality of elections
is not significant at all time periods after transition, as indicated by the overlapping confi-
dence intervals.
There appears to be no effect of NVR on the subdimensions of elected officials and inclu-
sive citizenship. After transition most regimes achieve high quality on these sub-dimensions,
regardless of their mode of transition. We obtain substantially the same results when we use
regression models and weights based on kernel matching to account for observable con-
founding factors in the estimation of the effect of NVR on the level of democratic quality
and its subdimensions after transition. We report detailed results from this analysis in the
Online Appendix. Thus, our analysis of post-transition levels of democratic quality provides
initial support for our hypotheses.
Figure 1. Average level of democratic quality before and after transition.
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However, as discussed above, these estimates do not account for potential unobserved
heterogeneity across regimes/countries. Therefore, we move from descriptive comparison of
post-transition levels of democratic quality to our DiD with kernel matching estimation. In
Figure 2, we report the DiD estimates for the matched samples. The figure shows point esti-
mates along with bootstrapped confidence intervals. As discussed above, we analyze changes
in the respective outcome variable from the year before the transition until up to five years
after the transition.
The point estimates in Figure 2 are average treatment effects on the treated. The average
change in polyarchy score is between 0.14 to 0.20 units higher in regimes with transitions
induced by NVR over the five years following transition compared with regimes without
NVR. This is a substantial difference, given that the scale for change in polyarchy ranges
from 21 to 1. For comparison, a difference of 0.2 is roughly equivalent to the difference in
level of democracy between the United States and Nepal in 2017. As also shown in Figure 2,
the lower bound of a 95% bootstrap confidence interval is above zero for the five years fol-
lowing the transition, meaning that for this time period we are 95% confident that a non-
zero difference in changes of polyarchy between treatment and control group falls into this
interval.
The bulk of this difference in polyarchy scores can be explained by associational auton-
omy and freedom of expression. There is no conclusive evidence regarding differences
between NVR and non-NVR regimes for the dimensions of elected officials and inclusive
citizenship. For elected officials point estimates are negative, indicating that NVR-induced
regimes improve less on this dimension than regimes without this feature. However,
Figure 2. Differences in change of democratic quality.
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confidence intervals for this outcome are large and include zero. Thus, we do not identify
any significant effect for this dimension. For inclusive citizenship point estimates are close
to zero, suggesting that there is no substantial effect of NVR on this sub-component. For
free and fair elections, the effect is positive and substantial, but only significant when
changes are measured three or four years after the transition.
In contrast, the DiD effects of NVR on freedom of expression and associational auton-
omy are substantial, significant and robust across all five time periods. For associational
autonomy point estimates range from 0.17 to 0.22, which implies that depending on the time
period the average change of the associational autonomy score is between 0.17 and 0.21 units
higher for regimes where transition was induced by NVR relative to regimes without this fea-
ture. For the freedom of expression dimension, point estimates are similar, ranging from
0.19 to 0.21.
Robustness of the results
To evaluate the robustness of the results discussed above, we conducted a sensitivity analysis
for the DiD specifications, in which we repeated the analysis with different datasets measur-
ing transition events and different parameter specifications for the matching procedure. We
used three datasets on the occurrence of transitions, varied coding rules for these transitions
and used different bandwidth specifications for kernel matching, The results of the sensitiv-
ity analysis support the findings described above. The effect of NVR on changes in polyar-
chy, freedom of expression, and associational autonomy is robust to changes in the data and
parameter specification. In contrast, the effect of NVR on changes in free and fair election is
sensitive to specification changes, with statistical significance depending on the dataset
used to measure transitions. The results for the elected officials and inclusive citizenship
subdimensions suggest no clear relationship with NVR. Additional simulation results indi-
cate that these main findings are also probably unaffected by unmeasured confounding vari-
ables that are not captured by the DiD approach. Detailed results for all robustness tests are
reported in the Online Appendix.
Discussion
We find strong evidence that initiating a democratic transition through NVR increases dem-
ocratic quality after transition relative to transitions without NVR. This effect is substantial
and robust for at least five years after the transition. Thus, our results support and expand
upon previous studies showing that NVR fosters democratization (Chenoweth and Stephan,
2011). Furthermore, through examining democratic sub-dimensions we find evidence for the
specific mechanisms whereby NVR improves democratic quality. The positive effect of
NVR is not uniform across all aspects of democracy. Instead, it can largely be attributed to
improvements in freedom of expression and associational autonomy. Changes in other
dimensions of democracy either do not appear to be affected by NVR, as with elected offi-
cials and inclusive citizenship, or our findings are not robust and thus do not allow a definite
judgment, as with improvements in free and fair elections.
The results have important implications for theories of (non-violent) resistance and demo-
cratization. Our findings support the arguments made by scholars of social movements and
non-violent resistance that resistance campaigns have spillover effects on post-transition
political developments (Della Porta and Diani, 2006: 245–49; Sharp, 2005: 428). This is most
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visible in an active civil society that raises its voice to protect and advance democracy and by
facilitating norms of free expression. However, the results also indicate that NVR is not a
democratic panacea. While NVR’s effect on more ‘‘expressive’’ dimensions of democracy is
consistent and powerful, it does not make much difference on more procedural and institu-
tional dimensions, and is inconsistent on free and fair elections. This is surprising, consider-
ing how frequently unfair elections are a critical spark in initiating NVR movements (Tucker
2007), and highlights the importance of disaggregating the mechanisms whereby non-violent
resistance affects political processes and institutions.
Still, it is important to reconsider the identifying assumptions of these findings and dis-
cuss alternative explanations. Most importantly, an alternative explanation for our findings
is that some temporally prior political dynamics foster both the occurrence of NVR and
democratization. We do not argue that the occurrence of an NVR campaign is a fully exo-
genous shock to a country’s political system. Campaigns of non-violent action have their
sources in prior political dynamics, social structures, and histories of political contention.
We address this problem through our empirical strategy of combining matching with DiD
estimation. Matching ensures that cases of NVR-induced transitions and cases of transitions
without NVR are similar regarding the observable factors of economic development, mili-
tary legacy, previous instability, urbanization, and democratic neighborhood. DiD addition-
ally accounts for static unobservable differences between countries/regimes. However,
although our robustness tests indicate otherwise, we cannot rule out the possibility of unob-
served political dynamics biasing our findings.
To address these general caveats about the internal validity of our findings, we suggest the
following two areas for further research. First, while we have offered theoretical mechanisms
derived from prominent historical cases as to why NVR so strongly impacts particular
dimensions of polyarchy, further research, including detailed case-specific evidence, is needed
to substantiate this theory and further our knowledge of NVR’s specific mechanisms of
impact. Micro-level process tracing could provide more detailed evidence on the sequencing
of non-violent protest events and liberalization measures by autocratic regimes, which occur
during democratic transition. Thereby, the direction of cause and effect could be identified
more clearly.
Second, more research is needed to disaggregate the population of democratic transitions
following NVR. As seen in prominent examples such as Poland, the Philippines, and South
Africa the population of NVR-induced transitions is highly heterogeneous. What factors
interfere with the generally pro-democratic effect of NVR? Are there systematic differences
in campaign strategies or transition styles that influence democratic political development?
These questions remain to be answered.
Keeping these caveats in mind, for policymakers interested in democratic development
these results speak powerfully to the importance of focusing on popular resistance rather
than top-down elites’ moves towards liberalization. While elite-led approaches can lead to
successful democratic transitions, the quality of the subsequent democracy is often severely
lacking. In contrast, when the transition comes from the bottom up, based on non-violent
mass mobilization, democratic quality is generally strengthened for the long term.
Specifically, civil society organizations and citizens’ freedom of expression will improve. In a
time when the prevalence and quality of democracy may be in decline, non-violent resistance
may help encourage its resurgence.
16 Conflict Management and Peace Science 00(0)
Acknowledgements
We are grateful to Markus Bayer, Charles Butcher, Ve´ronique Dudouet, Alexander De Juan, Daniel
Lambach, Susanne Pickel, and the anonymous reviewers for their insightful comments and suggestions.
Funding
Felix S. Bethke acknowledges funding from the German Research Foundation, project number
266771653.
ORCID iD
Felix S. Bethke https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4259-6071
Supplemental material
Supplemental material and the Online Appendix for this article are available online.
Notes
1. Most studies follow Sharp (1999) and Chenoweth and Stephan (2011) in defining non-violent
resistance as tactics for the application of power in pursuit of a political objective that are per-
formed by unarmed civilians without physical violence and outside the boundaries of institutiona-
lized politics.
2. Related literature also comes from studies analyzing the consequences of civil wars. Scholars argue
that, after the end of a civil war, there is a window of opportunity for political liberalization (e.g.
Wantchekon and Neeman, 2002). However, findings on this topic are inconclusive. Accordingly,
Fortna and Huang (2012: 807) conclude that ‘‘democratization in post-conflict societies looks
much like democratization elsewhere.’’
3. Other conceptualizations of transition modes exist. For instance, Huntington (1993) categorized
Third Wave democratic transitions as transformations, replacements, or transplacements depend-
ing on which political group took the lead in initiating democratization (the regime, opposition,
or both respectively).
4. Following Chenoweth and Lewis (2013: 417–418) we define a resistance campaign as an enduring
mass-level phenomenon where multiple actors pursue a common political goal. We limit the
population of resistance campaigns by size and scope to those that organize at least two different
collective action events with at least 1000 participants within one year. A resistance campaign is
non-violent if participants are mostly unarmed civilians who do not directly threaten or injure the
physical welfare of their opponents. Campaigns that do not meet these criteria are violent.
5. Our thanks to an anonymous reviewer for highlighting this example. For a detailed depiction, see
Ash (2014).
6. The campaign’s slogan was ‘‘Touche pas a` ma constitution’’ (‘‘Don’t touch my constitution’’).
7. Additionally, we excluded cases of democratization induced by external actors (e.g. Germany and
Italy after World War II).
8. There is little overlap between non-violent and violent campaigns for regime change in our set of
democratic transitions. These co-occur in only two cases: the Philippines in 1986 and Venezuela in
1959. In both the violent campaign was small and did not play a meaningful role in initiating the
transition, thus we code them as initiated through non-violent resistance.
9. We also tested an alternative approach excluding violent transitions. The results are substantially
similar and support the main findings described in the empirical section. The detailed results are
reported in the Online Appendix.
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10. We used V-Dem version 6.2. In the Online Appendix, we report additional results using the
Unified Democracy Scores (Pemstein et al., 2010) and Polity (Marshall et al., 2010).
11. A detailed description of all indicators used to measure polyarchy and its components is provided
in the Online Appendix.
12. In the Online Appendix we also conduct robustness checks adding a measure of political
repression.
13. Calculated with data from Haber and Menaldo (2011). The regions are: (1) Eastern Europe and
post Soviet Union (including Central Asia); (2) Latin America (including Cuba, Haiti, and
Dominican Republic); (3) North Africa and Middle East (including Israel, Turkey and Cyprus);
(4) Subsaharan Africa; (5) Western Europe and North America (including Australia and New
Zealand); (6) East Asia (including Japan and Mongolia); (7) Southeast Asia; (8) South Asia; (9)
The Pacific (excluding Australia and New Zealand); and (10) the Caribbean.
14. Additional details on the matching procedure are provided in the Online Appendix. For an appli-
cation of matching in combination with DiD estimation to study democratization see Colaresi
(2014).
15. Although our data indicates that non-violent resistance tends to emerge in environments more
hostile to democratic progress (see Online Appendix).
16. DiD assumes common time trends for treatment and control group. We evaluate this assump-
tion’s validity in the Online Appendix.
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